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FORCIBLE RAPE AND THE RIGHT TO BAIL
California courts are powerless to deny bail in forcible rape
cases. Article 1, section 12 of the California Constitution man-
dates that those charged with a non-capital offense must be
granted bail as a matter of right. Moreover, in In re Underwood
the California Supreme Court held that bail may not be denied to
protect the public. Despite the validity of the court's position, the
interests of society are underprotected with regard to the crime of
forcible rape. A constitutional amendment denying the right to
bail to those accused of forcible rape when "the proof is evident
or the presumption great" is needed. Although such an amend-
ment may be susceptible to constitutional attack, an analysis of
the United States Constitution reveals that there is no constitu-
tional roadblock to such an amendment.
INTRODUCTION
In Washington, D.C., a defendant was arrested for forcible rape. While
free on $1,000 bail, he committed a burglary and was released on $1,500
bail. While on bail for both offenses, he again committed forcible rape-
this time on a 15-year-old girl.1
Both rape2 and bai 3 are of ancient origin. Traditional views of
rape reflect a society concerned with the protection of a man's
right to the exclusive sexual possession of a woman, rather than
with the protection of a woman from sexual assault. A re-exami-
nation of sexual roles has resulted in shifting the focus of these
views to accommodate a changing view of women in society.4 For-
1. Younger, It's Time to Forfeit Bail, 5 Sw. U.L. REv. 262, 266 (1973) (citing a
Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Report).
2. Rape is mentioned in the first book of the Bible, which recounts the rape
of Jacob's virgin daughter Dinah. Berger, Man's Tria. Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1977).
3. Bail originated in medieval England as a device to free untried prisoners.
D. FREED & P. WALD, BA. rN THE UNMTED STATES: 1964 at 1 (1964).
4. Ireland, Reform Rape Legislatiown A New Standard of Sexual Responsibil-
ity, 49 U. CoLO. L. REV. 185, 185 nn.2 & 3 (1977). See also K. MMLLETT, SEXUAL
PoLurcs 70 (1971) ("Traditionally rape has been viewed as an offense one man
commits against another-a matter of abusing his woman.").
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cible rape5 is beginning to be recognized as a heinous crime com-
mitted not by one whose primary motive is sexual gratification,
but rather by one disposed to violence and seeking to inflict vio-
lence and harm upon the victim. 6 Recently, the Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected the notion that rape is not a serious
crime: "Next to murder there is [no crime] which ranks higher."7
On November 7, 1978, the citizens of Nebraska approved a con-
stitutional amendment denying bail to those accused of forcible
rape.8 The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the amendment in
Parker v. Roth9 and the United States Supreme Court declined to
review the case.1 0 By leaving the Nebraska law in operation, the
United States Supreme Court left other states free to follow Ne-
braska's lead.
Under current California law, a defendant in a criminal action is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, unless he is
charged with a capital crime. This right is guaranteed by article I,
section 12 of the California constitution." Because rape12 is not
punishable by death in California,13 it is not included in the capi-
5. Forcible rape is herein defined as a rape committed by means of physical
force or threat. The use of the word forcible eliminates statutory rape from this
definition.
6. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 115, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920
(1979).
7. Id. at 116.
8. NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (1978 Bail Amendment).
9. 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 117, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920 (1979).
10. 444 U.S. 920 (1979).
11. CAI. CONST. art I, § 12 (West Supp. 1955-1979); In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d
345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1970-1979):
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator under any of the following circumstances:
1. Where a person is incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness
of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent;
2. Where a person resists, but the person's resistance is overcome by
force or violence;
3. Where a person is prevented from resisting by threats of great and
immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, or
by any intoxicating narcotic, or anesthetic substance, administered by or
with the privity of the accused;
4. Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act,
and this is known to the accused;
5. Where a persom submits under the belief that the person commit-
ting the act is the victim's spouse, and this belief is induced by any arti-
cles, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to
induce such belief.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1970-1979): "Rape, as defined in Sec-
tion 261, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six or eight
years .... "
CAL. PENAL CODE § 264.1 (West Supp. 1970-1979) states:
The provisions of Section 264 notwithstanding, in any case in which de-
fendant, voluntarily acting in concert with another person, by force or vio-
lence and against the will of the victim, committed the rape, either
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tal crime exception to the right to bail. Therefore, California
courts are powerless to deny bail in forcible rape cases.
Nonetheless, there is a legitimate concern for the safety of the
community when a defendant who has been charged with forcible
rape is free on bail. Because the courts are not constitutionally
free to deny bail in forcible rape cases, the only viable alternative
is a constitutional amendment. This amendment would not deny
bail in every case where an individual is charged with forcible
rape. Bail could only be denied after showing either that the
proof of the charge was evident or that the presumption was great
that the crime was committed. An unsubstantiated charge would
not result in incarceration. Such an amendment is susceptible to
attack on three major constitutional grounds: the eighth amend-
ment prohibition against excessive bail, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the presumption of in-
nocence guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This Comment will illustrate that such an amend-
ment does not violate any constitutional provision. The people of
California have the power to deny bail to those accused of forcible
rape.14
THE, CRIME OF FORCIBLE RAPE
The increasing number of rapes in this countryl and the inher-
personally or by aiding and abetting such other person, such fact shall be
charged in the indictment or information and if found to be true by the
jury, upon a jury trial, or if found to be true by the court, upon a court
trial, or if admitted by the defendant, defendant shall suffer confinement
in the state prison for five, seven or nine years.
14. This Comment is concerned with the right to bail pending trial and convic-
tion. For a discussion of the right to bail pending appeal, see Scott & Wedner,
Stated Discretion and Bail Pending Appeal: Judicial Silence May No Longer Be
Golden, 8 Sw. U.I. REV. 810 (1976); Comment, Post-Conviction Criminal Rights:
Parole and Probation Revocation and Bail, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 682 (1974-75).
15. Rape is the fastest growing and most frequently committed violent crime
in America today. Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, in FORCIBLE RAPE-THE
CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER 48 (1977).








ent gravity of the crime demand that its elimination be given in-
creased attention.
The problem of rape is rapidly approaching epidemic proportions....
[L]egislators have a unique opportunity and a pressing responsibility; im-
mediate legal reform [is needed] to prevent the rape epidemic before it
happens. Legislators have the power that no single concerned citizen, and
no women's organization has the power to say to an entire class of poten-
tial criminal offenders that violence in the form of sexual assault is not
only anti-social but also will result in certain punishment.... Without
prompt action on this crisis hundreds of people will be assaulted while the
assaulters continue. This certainly far outweighs the uncertain benefits of
more years of deliberation. 16
Statements like this represent the growing recognition that rape
is a critical problem in our society. Recently there has been an
extensive review of the law concerning the crime of rape.'7 Virtu-
ally every state has considered revising its rape statutes. The



















FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 13 (1979).
The number of forcible rapes reported in 1979 represented an increase of 100%
from 1970. Id. at 13. In addition, victimization studies indicate that rape is one of
the most underreported of all major crimes. The ratio of reported to unreported
rapes is estimated anywhere from one in three to one in five. 2 NATIONAL INsTI-
TOTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANc E
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as FORCIBLE RAPE]. If the actual number of rapes is conservatively estimated to
be four times the reported number, almost one third of a million rapes were com-
mitted in 1979. This means that in 1979 one in every 330 women in the United
States was sexually assaulted. See id. at 3.
16. MICHIGAN TASK FORCE ON RAPE, BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR A PROPOSAL
FOR CRIMINAL CODE REFORM TO RESPOND TO MICHIGAN'S RAPE CRISIS 1 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE
303 (1974); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF.
L REV. 919 (1973); Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law,
11 WILLSmETIE L.J. 36 (1974).
18. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the
Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463 (1975); Note, Recent Statutory Developments in
the Definition ofForcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500 (1975).
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evidentiary requirements, 9 and making the provision of services
to victims mandatory.20
The crime of rape is traumatic and dehumanizing. At the very
least, the victim of a rape is subjected to an extremely personal
intrusion upon her body. Frequently the victim is treated brutally
by the attacker and suffers substantial physical injuries.2' In
Coker v. Georgia22 the United States Supreme Court commented
on the crime of rape:
It is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total
contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim
and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate rela-
tionships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate vio-
lation of self." It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force,
or the threat of force or intimidation, to overcome the will and the capac-
ity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical in-
jury to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage.
Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public
injury as well 2 3
Some victims are so badly injured physically and/or psychologi-
cally that their lives are beyond repair. The long-range effect
upon the life and health of a rape victim is impossible to measure.
Rape is not a mere physical attack, it is extremely destructive of
the human personality.24 As Chief Justice Burger stated in
Coker, "Victims may recover from the physical damage of knife
or bullet wounds or beatings with fists or a club, but recovery
from such a gross assault on the human personality is not healed
by medicine or surgery."25
Justifiably, the focus of societal concern has been the rape vic-
tim. As a result, however, information on rape offenders is far
19. For a discussion of this issue, see Berger, Man's Tria Woman's Tribula-
tion: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COL.uM. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note, Repeal of the
Corroboration Requirement: Will It Tip the Scales of Justice?, 24 DRAKE L. REV.
669 (1975); Note, Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law
Rule Admitting Evidence of a Rape Victim's Character for Chastity, 7 Loy. CmL
L.J. 118 (1976); Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81
YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
20. For a discussion of this issue, see Abarbanel, Helping Victims of Rape, 21
Soc. WORK 478 (1976); McCombie, Bossuk, Savitz & Pell, Development of a Medical
Center Rape Crisis Intervention Program, 133 Am. J. PSYCH. 418 (1976).
21. Oretsky, Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape: The Delicate Balance Between
the Rights of Victim and Defendant, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 481, 507 (1978).
22. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
23. Id. at 597-98.
24. See Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Asm.
Calm. L. REV. 335 (1973); FoRcmLE RAPE, supra note 15, at 5-7.
25. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 612 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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from extensive.26 Only recently has it been recognized that the
primary motive for forcible rape is a desire to inflict humiliation,
violence, and harm upon the victim. It is not a desire for sexual
gratification. Rape is not the result of an uncontrollable sexual
urge that is spontaneously released.27 A person who has commit-
ted such a violent, psychologically motivated crime is capable of
committing a similar crime while free on bail.28
Those charged with forcible rape pose a significant threat to so-
ciety and to their victims. They should not be released on bail
pending trial. Members of the community, as well as a criminal
defendant, have a constitutional right to life and liberty and
should not have to sacrifice their lives or safety as a price of
granting bail to a dangerous rapist prior to trial.
FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES TO BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES
The decision to deny bail to one accused of forcible rape is de-
termined by the state's view of the purpose of bail. Although bail
is mentioned in the constitutions of all fifty states,29 each state's
conception of the purpose of bail is not the same. An examination
26. The only extensive study on the proffile of sex offenders is M. Aim, PAT-
TERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971).
27. See Groth & Burgess, Rape: A Sexual Deviation, 47 Am. J. ORTHo-PsYCH.
400 (1977).
28. In 1976 the Battelle Law & Justice Study Center conducted interviews with
a group of convicted rapists. The 50 rapists who were interviewed were patients at
Atascadero State Hospital. An examination of the arrest histories of these 50 indi-
viduals was also undertaken. These 50 rapists demonstrated a wide range of previ-
ous criminal activity. The official records listed a total of 142 rape convictions or
arrests among the group. The 50 rapists also admitted to 69 additional rapes for
which they had not been caught. Three-quarters of the men had at least one pre-
vious arrest for robbery or assault; five had been arrested for homicide and three
convicted of rape/homicide. Although the group is not representative of the entire
rapist population, their history of violent crimes is striking. Even more striking,
however, is the repetitiveness of the criminal acts. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAw
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE-FI-
NAL PROJECT REPORT 11 (1978). See also text accompanying notes 145-50 infra.
In addition, increased bail reforms and court delays have apparently caused an
increase in the number of crimes committed by defendants between the time they
are arrested and the time they come to trial. This is because of the fact that more
defendants are free for a longer time pending disposition of their cases. Portman,
"To Detain or Not to Detain?"--A Review of the Background, Current Proposals,
and Debate on Preventive Detention, 10 SANTA CLARA LAw. 224, 226 (1970).
29. Thirty-one states have constitutional provisions granting a right to bail in
criminal offenses except in capital cases in certain instances: ALA. CONST. art. I,
§ 16; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; Aniz. CONsT. art. 1, § 22; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 8; DEL
CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IoWA CONST. art. I,
§ 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 9; Ky. CONST., § 16; LA. CONST. art. I, § 18; MINN.
CONsT. art. I, § 7; MIss. CONST. art. III, § 29; Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 20; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 21; NEv. CONsT. art. I, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 13;
N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 6; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONsT. art. II, § 8; PA. CONST.
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of each state's bail system reveals that bail has two basic pur-
poses-to compel a defendant's presence at trial and to protect
the safety of the community. The traditional and most prevalent
purpose for bail is to compel a defendant's appearance at trial by
the use of economic pressure.30 This use of bail reconciles the so-
cietal interest in assuring that the accused will appear for trial
and submit to the judgment of the court, with the defendant's in-
terest in avoiding any premature and perhaps unjustifiable pun-
ishment.3 1 Bail assures the orderly progression of the criminal
proceeding while it minimizes interference with individual free-
dom. 32
California's constitutional provision is typical of those states
art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. V1, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; VT. CONST. ch. I, § 40;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20; Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 8; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
Two state constitutions grant a right to bail unless the defendant is accused of
murder or treason: IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 14.
The Nebraska constitution grants a right to bail unless the defendant is accused
of murder, treason, or forcible rape: NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Three state constitutions grant a right to bail unless the defendant is charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment: FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 14; R.I. CONsT. art. I, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. I § 15.
The Texas constitution grants a right to bail except in capital cases in certain
instances, or where the defendant has twice been previously convicted of a non-
capital felony, is accused of committing a non-capital felony while free on bail for
a prior felony, or is accused of a non-capital felony involving the use of a deadly
weapon after being convicted of a prior felony: TEX. CONST.'art. I, §§ 11, 11(a).
The Utah constitution grants a right to bail except in capital cases in certain in-
stances or where the defendant is accused of the commission of a felony while on
probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony
charge: UTAH CONsT. art. I, § 8.
The Michigan constitution grants a right to bail unless the defendant has certain
specified previous convictions, or has committed a felony while on bail, pending
the disposition of a prior violent felony charge, or while on probation or parole as
a result of a prior conviction for a violent felony: MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15.
The Maine constitution is unique: ME. CONST. art. I, § 10:
No person before conviction shall be bailable for any of the crimes
which now are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adop-
tion of the Constitution, when the proof is evident or the presumption
great, whatever the punishment of the crimes may be.
The nine remaining states have no right to bail provision but do have a counter-
part of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting exces-
sive bail.
30. D. FREED & P. WALD, BAmL IN THE UNrED STATES: 1964 at vii (1964); Note,
Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 970 (1961).
31. Comment, Preventive Detention and Equal Protection of the Law in Texas,
10 ST. MARY'S LJ. 133, 133 (1978).
32. Comment, Footnote to Furman: Failing Justification for the Capital Case
Exception to the Right to Bail After Abolition of the Death Penalty, 10 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 349, 360 (1973).
1067
that adhere to this purpose: "A person shall be released on bail
by sufficient sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are
evident or the presumption great."33 Although this provision does
not provide an absolute right to bail in all cases, "[t]he underly-
ing motive for denying bail in... capital cases is to assure the
accused's presence at trial. In a choice between hazarding his life
before a jury and forfeiting his . . .property, the framers of the
Constitution obviously reacted to man's undoubted urge to prefer
the latter."34 Therefore, the denial of bail in capital cases is in ac-
cord with the assurance-type statutes.
The Bail Reform Act of 1966,35 which governs federal bail law, is
also an assurance-type statute. A person charged with a non-capi-
tal offense should be admitted to bail, while in capital cases the
judge has discretion to deny bail. The legislative declaration of
purpose expressly disclaims any intent to adopt a system
whereby bail could be denied on the basis of danger to the com-
munity.3 6
A far less accepted purpose of bail is that of protecting society
from further criminal activity by the defdndant while he awaits
trial.37 The practice of denying bail to the dangerous is termed
33. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 12.
34. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3152 (1976).
36. H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2293, 2296:
This legislation does not deal with the problem of the preventive deten-
tion of the accused because of the possibility that his liberty might endan-
ger the public, either because of the possibility of the commission of
further acts of violence by the accused during the pretrial period, or be-
cause of the fact that he is at large might result in the intimidation of wit-
nesses or the destruction of evidence.
For the argument that an inherent extra-statutory judicial power still exists to
deny bail under the Bail Reform Act of 1966, see Note, United States v. Bigelow:
Inherent Extra-Statutory Judicial Power to Deny Bail, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 875.
The author concludes that bail can be denied in a non-capital case where the de-
nial is not a form of punishment for unproved crimes and where it would be irre-
sponsible to release the defendant. Id. at 884.
37. Comment, supra note 32, at 366-72.
It is interesting to note that even in those jurisdictions that maintain that the
sole purpose of bail is to deter the flight of the defendant, there is a discrepancy
between theoretical application and actual practice. Preventive detention exists in
a sub-rosa form in the common practice of setting extremely high bail for persons
thought to be a danger to the community, regardless of a lack of evidence indicat-
ing a likelihood of flight. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERn REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CIW~mAL JUSTICE 149-219 (1965).
See also AimmucAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA PROJEcT ON MHmnrM STANDARDS FOR
CRnAINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 6 (1968):
[I]t is no secret that many judges when faced with a defendant whom
they fear will commit "additional crimes" if released, feel compelled to set
bail beyond his reach. In effect, bail is used to deny rather than to facili-
tate pretrial release .... So-called preventive detention should be dealt
1068
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preventive detention.38 The practice of preventive detention has
given rise to a great deal of controversy.39 Some people have at-
tacked it as unconstitutional, as representing a sharp break with
our legal tradition, and as historically wrong.40 Others see no con-
stitutional violation because the right to bail is a statutory right.41
A decision to amend California's constitution so as to allow denial
of bail if the defendant is accused of forcible rape necessarily in-
volves this controversy over preventive detention. Arguably, an
accused should be detained when it appears likely he will flee or
commit other crimes while out on bail. Those states whose only
concern is for the rights of the accused can be criticized as ignor-
ing society's interest in protecting itself against dangerous
crninals.
CALroIRNAls APPROACH TO BAIL
California's bail scheme does not provide for a system of pre-
ventive detention. Implying a preference for the rights of the ac-
cused, California has an assurance-type system which is
mandated by article I, section 12 of the California constitution.42
The Penal Code implements this constitutional mandate.43 Under
with openly and on its own merits, not masked behind manipulations of
bail amounts.
See also Hearings on Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966 Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 255 (1969) (testimony of James F. Hewitt, Legal Aid Society of San Fran-
cisco): "As a practical matter, Senator, we have preventive detention. We know
that district judges are setting high bail for people they believe to be dangerous,
and we know that appellate courts are affirming those bail settings."
38. Cogan, The Pennsylvania Bail Provisions: The Legality of Preventive De-
tention, 44 TE nr. L.Q. 51 (1970).
39. For discussions of the controversy over preventive detention, see Ervin,
Foreword:- Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (1971); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts.
1-2), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1125 (1965); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Deten-
tion, 60 GEO. L.J. 1139 (1972); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of
Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969); Portman, supra note 28; Tribe, An
Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L.
REV. 371 (1970).
40. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 39; Tribe, supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 39; Mitchell, supra note 39.
42. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12: "A person shall be released on bail by sufficient
sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption
great. .. ."
43. CA. PENAL CODE § 1268a (West Supp. 1970-1979). "[A] defendant shall be
released from custody prior to conviction upon the posting of bail as a matter of
right, or the defendant may be released from custody upon his or her own recogni-
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current California law, a defendant is entitled to be released on
bail "as a matter of right" unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with death and "the proof [of his guilt] is evident or
the presumption thereof great."44 The only discretion vested in
the trial judge is in setting the amount of bail,45 which may not be
excessive.46 The statutes 47 and judicial decisions 48 have evolved
the principle that the possiblity that an innocent party might be
unjustifiably punished outweighs the risk that the guilty might es-
cape. This principle assumes that the risk of escape is the only
factor which can be balanced against the possibility of unnecessa-
rily punishing the innocent.
California has not always adhered to this bail policy. For many
years the California courts took a more restrictive approach to
granting bail by interpreting article I, section 12 of the California
constitution to provide a public safety exception to the right to
bail.49 Bail could be denied to one accused of a non-capital crimi-
zance, except that a defendant charged with an offense punishable with death
where the proof is evident or the presumption thereof great shall not be released
from custody."
44. CAL PENAL CODE § 1268a (West Supp. 1970-1979).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West 1970). "In fixing the amount of bail, the
judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his
appearing at the trial or hearing of the case." See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269c
(West Supp. 1970-1979).
46. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12: "Excessive bail may not be required...
47. CAL PENAL CODE § 1268a (West Supp. 1970-1979).
48. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973). Un-
derwood was charged with possession of a sawed-off shotgun, attempted murder,
attempt to explode a destructive device with intent to commit murder, attempt to
explode a destructive device with intent to injure people or property, and posses-
sion of a destructive device. Release on bail was denied by the trial court, appar-
ently on the basis of public safety. The California Supreme Court proclaimed the
right to bail in California in absolute terms: the lower court had erred in denying
Underwood the opportunity to post reasonable bail because he was not charged
with an offense punishable with death and there is no implied public safety excep-
tion.
49. Several decisions by the California Court of Appeals and the California
Supreme Court interpreted article I, section 6 of the California constitution shortly
after it was enacted. Although the 1879 case of Ex parte Duncan, 54 Cal. 75 (1879),
was specifically concerned with an application for reduction of bail, the court did
state in dictum that the express words of article I, section 6 of the California con-
stitution secured to a defendant the right to be admitted to bail upon a non-capital
indictment. The court found this right to bail was strikingly indicative of the ex-
treme jealousy with which the law guards the personal liberty of the citizen from
any unwarrantable or unnecessary restraint. Id. at 77. Ex parte Ruef, 8 Cal. App.
468, 97 P. 89 (1908) (citing People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862)), and In re Scaggs, 47
Cal. 2d 416, 303 P.2d 1009 (1956), also concluded that admission to bail in non-capi-
tal cases is a constitutional right which a defendant can claim and which no court
can properly refuse. In Scaggs the court distinguished bail prior to conviction on
a pending charge from bail after conviction and pending appeal, declaring that bail
in the former was a matter of right if the offense was not punishable with death,
whereas in the latter bail was a matter of discretion with the court. Id. at 418, 303
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nal offense in order to ensure the safety of the individual or for
the protection of society.
P.2d at 1011. See Note, Bail As A Matter of Right-In re Underwood, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 559 (1974).
The first case which appears to depart from this traditional interpretation is In
re Henley, 18 Cal. App. 1, 121 P. 933 (1912). See Note, Bail as a Matter of Right-In
re Underwood, 26 HASTINGS L.3. 559, 569 (1974). Henley was arrested on a warrant
which had been issued under a statute providing for the arrest and commitment of
inebriates. Bail was denied by the magistrate without grounds being stated. The
court of appeal found that the scope of the right-to-bail provision in article I, sec-
tion 6 of the California constitution included a person charged with being an ine-
briate.
His right as to bail should certainly not be more restricted than that of a
person accused of a grave crime. In the latter contingency no question
would be raised except in the case of a capital offense as provided in the
constitution. [But] [t]here might be instances under this statute where,
for the safety of the individual or of society, it would be proper to deny
bail.
18 Cal. App. at 4-5, 121 P. at 935 (emphasis added).
Despite the court's recognition of the public safety exception, it found the denial
of bail improper, even though the defendant's behavior arguably justified deten-
tion for the protection of the public. Moreover, the court's statement regarding
"instances.. . where ... it would be proper to deny bail" expressly relates to in-
stances under the civil commitment inebriates statute. The court expressly stated
that where a person was accused of a grave crime, "no question would be raised"
regarding the accused's right to bail except in the case of a capital offense. More-
over, said "instances under the statute" justifying denial of bail were not enumer-
ated. The statement is merely dictum relating to a particular statute.
Nonetheless, failing to take proper account of the language "under this statute,"
numerous court opinions in California have cited Henley for a proposition for
which it does not stand-the proposition that bail may be denied for a criminal
non-capital offense for the safety of the individual or of society.
In re Westcott, 93 Cal. App. 575, 270 P. 247 (1928), was the first case to make this
erroneous interpretation. The defendant in Westcott was charged with murder
and his sanity was in doubt. He had previously been convicted of this same mur-
der, but both convictions were overturned on appeal. The court in citing Henley
said that although there might be some instances where it would be proper to
deny bail for the safety of the individual or protection of society, there was no
showing in this particular case that to fix bail would endanger the public. It is in-
teresting to note that although Westcott relies on the public safety language in
Henley, it provides less support for that proposition than its language might indi-
cate. The court refused to deprive Westcott of his pretrial liberty by denying bail
despite the fact that he was an allegedly dangerous individual. Comment, Public
Safety Exception to Right to Bail, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 564 (1974).
In Evans v, Municipal Court, 207 Cal. App. 2d 633, 24 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1962), the
defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and
was detained for approximately four hours to allow him to sober up. Relying on
Henley, Westcott, In re Gentry, 206 Cal. App. 2d 723, 234 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1962) and
In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951), the court held that the de-
fendant did not have the right to immediate release on bail. A police officer has
the discretion to deny immediate release on bail if "to do so would endanger ap-
pellant or society." Id. at 636, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 635. Although Evans perpetuates the
erroneous interpretation of Henley, it can obviously be limited to its facts. There
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In 1973 the California Supreme Court resolved the conflict be-
is no suggestion that denial of bail for a longer period, or where an intoxicating
condition was not present, would be proper.
The court's flirtation with a public safety exception to the right to bail in non-
capital cases culminated in Bean v. County of Los Angeles, 252 Cal. App. 2d 754, 60
Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967). There, the issue before the court concerned a bail forfeiture
in a criminal misdemeanor case. In discussing the matter the court stated that:
A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right except for a capital offense when the proof is evident or the
presumption great ... or where for the safety of the individual or for the
protection of society it would be proper to deny bail.
Id. at 757, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 807 (citing Evans v. Municipal Court, 207 Cal. App. 2d
633, 24 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1962); In re Gentry, 206 Cal. App. 2d 723, 234 Cal. Rptr. 208
(1962); In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951); In re Westcott, 93 Cal.
App. 575, 270 P. 247 (1928); In re Henley, 18 Cal. App. 1, 121 P. 933 (1912)). This
statement regarding the propriety of denying bail was dictum and was not in any
way necessary for the result in that case. Even as dictum the Bean statement is
not persuasive authority because it does not reflect an accurate interpretation of
the cited cases.
In the case of In re Medina, 2d Crim. 17732 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1970), the court
of appeal, relying on Bean, denied Medina's petition for habeas corpus to set bail
pending trial without opinion. Thereafter the California Supreme Court denied
Medina's petition for writ of habeas corpus to set bail. In re Medina, Crim. No.
14380 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 1970). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus to set bail
pending trial was granted by the United States District Court upon grounds that
Medina's bail pending trial had been unconstitutionally revoked. Medina v. Pitch-
ess, Civil No. 70-583-WPG (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1970). Because Medina's petition for
writ of habeas corpus was denied without opinion by the court of appeal and the
California Supreme Court, and because that denial was overturned by a federal
court, that denial should not be considered as affirming Bean and the judicially
created public safety exception to article I, section 12 and Penal Code section
1268a.
From Westcott to Medina only one court correctly interpreted Henley. In re
Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951), written by Justice McComb while
he was sitting on the court of appeal, stands for strict adherence to a broad princi-
ple of a constitutional right to bail in non-capital cases.
Only by strict adherence to this principle are we assured of the guaran-
tees of the Constitution in the equal administration of the laws where
there are many judges of differing degrees of education, age, experience &
background.
History has demonstrated beyond a doubt that such a guaranty as is set
forth in article I, section 6 of the [California] Constitution is necessary for
the protection of the citizen, and that it should be preserved at all
hazards. Any judicial officer who refuses to give his loyalty to this ideal
because of his feelings of revulsion at the nature of the offense charged
against the accused either does not conceive the doctrine in its full mean-
ing or he profanes the hallowed words of the patriots who convened in
Philadelphia in 1787.
Id. at 219-20, 233 P.2d at 162-63. Although the case concerned the right to bail after
conviction and pending appeal, Justice McComb's comments are equally applica-
ble to the right to bail before trial:
Irrespective of the villainy of the accused or the heinousness of his of-
fense, without regard for public opinion, or for the personal views of an
individual officer as to the wisdom of the constitutional provision [art. I,
§ 6], such provision is binding without qualification upon the courts until
the people have ... legally erased the constitutional mandate.
Id. at 219, 233 P.2d at 162.
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tween the seemingly clear words of the California constitution5O
and the developing case law which created a public safety excep-
tion to the right to bail in non-capital cases.5 1 Albert B. Under-
wood III was arrested for possession of a sawed-off shotgun and
shells.52 While on bail for that offense Underwood was charged
with possession of a sawed-off shotgun, attempted murder, at-
tempting to explode a destructive device with intent to commit
murder, attempting to explode a destructive device with intent to
injure people or property, and possession of a destructive de-
vice.53 The trial court denied bail on the grounds that the safety
of the community would be jeopardized if Underwood was
granted bail.54 In the case of In re Underwood-5 the California
Supreme Court, with Justice Burke dissenting,56 found that the
50. CA. CONST. art. I, § 12: "A person shall be released on bail by sufficient
sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption
great. .
51. See, e.g., Bean v. County of Los Angeles, 252 Cal. App. 2d 754, 60 Cal. Rptr.
804 (1967).
52. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 346, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
53. Id. at 347, 508 P.2d at 722, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
54. People v. Underwood, No. A-122689, slip op. at 11 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 25,
1972) (order denying bail). The trial judge believes that,
[I]n this day and age there is so much violence and murder that we
have to stop it .... The time has come where we must restrain violence
and deaths as much as possible. If it is necessary to resolve it by denying
bail to those who can or are able to perpetrate murders and violence and
crimes of that nature then the Court at this time will not be reluctant to
deny bail, and bail is denied. Let the District Court of Appeal make their
ruling.
55. 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
56. Justice Burke registered a vehement dissent. He asserted that the lan-
guage of art. I, § 6 would permit the judiciary to "retain the inherent power to
achieve a suitable balance between society's right of defense, protection and
safety, and defendant's own right to bail." Id. at 353, 508 P.2d at 727, 107 Cal. Rptr.
at 407. He based this proposition on the fact that the framers of the California con-
stitution also included art. I, § 1 which recognizes the "inalienable right' of all
men to enjoy and defend their life and liberty, to protect their property and to pur-
sue and obtain safety and happiness." Id. at 353, 508 P.2d 727, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
According to Justice Burke, in order to guarantee the right to "obtain safety," the
judiciary must have the authority to deny bail to dangerous defendants.
On the surface, there is a conflict between the right of an individual in society to
"obtain safety" and the right of a defendant to be released on bail. This conflict,
however, can be resolved by the application of a rule of construction. The lan-
guage of art. I, § 6 is specific; it is not vague or ambiguous. Art. I, § 1, on the other
hand, is open to a much broader interpretation. When constitutional provisions
conflict, the provision that is more specific prevails. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
596, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619 (1971). In addition, an argument could
be made that the two provisions do not conflict. Art. I, § 6 merely fulfills art. I, § 1
in that if bail were a matter of discretion, then everyone would be subject to un-
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trial court erred in denying bail to Underwood on the basis of his
dangerous propensities. The court held that a defendant in a
criminal action has the right to be released on bail except where
charged with a capital offense when the proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt great. The court explicitly stated that the
only legal purpose of bail is "to assure the defendant's attendance
in court."5 7 Bail cannot be used to punish the defendant58 or to
protect the public.59 Article I, section 12 cannot be interpreted to
allow a denial of bail based on the dangerous propensities of the
defendant.60
reasonable or arbitrary detention. Note, Bail as a Matter of Right-In re Under-
wood, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 559, 568 n.44 (1974).
57. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 348, 508 P.2d 721, 723, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403
(19.73) (citing In re Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 360 P.2d 43, 11 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1961); In
re Brumback, 46 Cal. 2d 810, 299 P.2d 217 (1956)).
58. See also Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 300 P.2d 187 (1956).
59. The court indicated that protection of the public must be secured through
the process of civil commitment. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 350 n.8, 508 P.2d
721, 724 n.8, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 n.8 (1973). As pointed out by Justice Burke in
his dissent, the effectiveness of civil commitment in keeping society safe from
truly dangerous persons is questionable. Id. at 352 n.1, 508 P.2d at 726 n.1, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 406 n.l. See generally Note, Control and Treatment of Narcotics Addicts:
Civil Commitment in California, 6 SAN DIEGO L. Ruv. 35 (1969).
.60. The majority said, "[T]here is no validity in the argument that there is an
implied public safety exception in statutory or other provisions guaranteeing the
righf to bail and we hold that such an exception does not exist in view of the clear
direction of article I, section 6." In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 350, 508 P.2d 721,
724, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (1973).
It is interesting to note that this is the same California court that decided People
v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), one year earlier.
By abolishing the death penalty, the court was faced with the question of whether
those charged with previously capital crimes would now be entitled to bail. The
usual reason for denying bail in capital cases, and no doubt the rationale behind
California's provision, is "fear of flight"--the recognition that the danger of flight is
at its greatest when a defendant's life is at stake and that no amount of economic
motivation can assure his attendance in court. In re Corbo, 54 N.J. Super. 575, 149
A.2d 828, 834 (1959). When the possibility of execution is removed, the fear of
flight rationale breaks down. Thus, if the sole reason for the denial of bail in capi-
tal crimes is the high risk of flight, it should follow that if the death penalty is
abolished the right to bail must be extended to cover the previously capital
crimes. Yet that was not the result reached by the Anderson court:
[A]rticle I, section 6 of the California constitution and section 1270 of
the Penal Code, dealing with the subject of bail, refer to a category of of-
fenses for which the punishment of death could be imposed and bail
should be denied under certain circumstances. The law thus determined
the gravity of such offenses both for the purpose of fixing bail before trial
and for imposing punishment after conviction. Those offenses, of course,
remain the same but under the decision in this case punishment by death
cannot constitutionally be exacted. The underlying gravity of those of-
fenses endures and the determination of their gravity for the purpose of
bail continues unaffected by this decision, Accordingly, to subserve such
purpose ... we hold they remain as offenses for which bail should be de-
nied in conformity with article I, section 6 of the California constitution
and Penal Code section 1270 when the proof of guilt is evident or the pre-
sumption thereof great.
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The majority's position is supported by several aspects of the
history of bail in California.6 1 Because there was minimal debate
regarding article I, section 12 of the California constitution,62
there is very little legislative history on which to rely. A provision
concerning excessive bail was accepted as part of the California
Bill of Rights with no reported discussion. 63 The language that
provided that all persons shall be bailable except those charged
with a capital offense, was added on September 28, 1849, with only
one relevant comment:
It has been thought by some that the section which we have just adopted
[the excessive bail clause] covers this entire ground; but in my opinion it
does not. This section is a part of the common law, and as we have not
adopted the common law, and perhaps may not, I think it very necessary
that such a section should be introduced so that in all cases, except capi-
tal offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great, the party
accused shall be entitled to bail. An innocent man may be kept in prison
and refused bail, without such a provision as this.6 4
As the court in Underwood pointed out, this section was con-
sciously added to the excessive bail provision in order to ex-
pressly indicate that all except the one class of defendants were
to be bailable.65 Penal Code section 1268a,6 6 which implements
6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 900 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171 n.45 (1972).
The Anderson court appears to have adopted a different theory of bail entirely-
one that considers the danger to the public as well as the possibility of flight. Bail
was portrayed as a function of the gravity of the offense, not of the punishment.
This implies that denial of bail has a relation to dangerousness as well as to the
likelihood of flight. It is unclear what happened between Anderson, decided in
1972, and Underwood to cause a change in the court's mind. Obviously the denial
of bail for those crimes that were previously capital was upheld for the protection
of the public safety, just as bail was denied to Underwood by the lower court for
the same reason.
For a more complete discussion of the relationship between the abolition of the
death penalty and the capital case exception to the right to bail, see Comment, The
Right to Bail in Capital Cases: The Effect of the Legislative Response to Furman v.
Georgia, 8 Cmi. L. REV. 229 (1977); 2 HOFsTRA L. REV. 432 (1974).
61. Comment, Public Safety Exception to Right to Bail, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 561,
563 (1972).
62. Note, Bail as a Matter of Right-In re Underwood, 26 HASTINGS UJ. 559, 564
(1974).
63. J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON
THE FOMATION OF THE STATE CONsTrrUrION 41 (1850) [hereinafter cited as DE-
BATES]. It is significant that this right is included in the Bill of Rights for this sec-
tion is the repository of those rights most cherished and guarded by the framers.
People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862).
64. DEBATES, supra note 63, at 293, cited in Note, Bail as a Matter of Right-In
re Underwood, 26 HASTINGS LIJ. 559, 564 (1974).
65. 9 Cal. 3d at 349-50, 508 P.2d at 724, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1268a (West Supp. 1970-1979): "[A] defendant shall be
released from custody prior to conviction upon the posting of bail as a matter of
1075
article I, section 12, supports the contention that pretrial liberty
was intended to be a matter of right in non-capital cases. 67
Several decisions of the California Court of Appeals and the
California Supreme Court interpreting article I, section 12 shortly
after it was adopted68 came to the conclusion that admission to
bail in non-capital cases is a constitutional right which no court
can properly refuse. Subsequent cases that proclaimed a public
safety exception to this right to bail were based on an erroneous
interpretation of the case of In re Henley.69
Furthermore the language used in article I, section 12 plainly
and unequivocally indicates a definite and certain purpose to be
accomplished, and courts must construe it so as to carry out that
purpose. Clearly, article I, section 12 provides that all persons
shall be bailable for non-capital offenses by sufficient sureties.
The terms and conditions are neither vague nor ambiguous.
The result reached by the majority in Underwood gives pre-
ferred status to the rights of the individual defendant over the
rights of the community. It stresses the defendant's right to be
released on bail pending trial regardless of any potential danger
he may present.70 A defendant who repeatedly commits the same
non-capital offense, for example rape, but who faithfully appears
in court could be released. On the other hand, a forgetful defend-
ant who fails to appear on time may be denied bail.71 In electing
to favor the interests of the defendant in obtaining pretrial free-
dom, California courts are neglecting the protection of society.72
The California Supreme Court entrusted this concern for the
public safety to the area of civil commitment.7 3 But, as Justice
Burke noted in his dissent, the provisions of the Welfare and In-
stitutions Code would be ineffective in most instances.74 Sections
right, or the defendant may be released from custody upon his or her own recogni-
zance, except that a defendant charged with an offense punishable with death
where the proof is evident or the presumption thereof great shall not be released
from custody."
67. Comment, Public Safety Exception to Right to Bail, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 561,
563 (1974).
68. See note 49 supra. When a judicial interpretation of the meaning and ef-
fect of a provision of the constitution is made near the time of its adoption, it is
strong evidence that that interpretation reflects the *rue meaning and intent of the
framers. Knowles v. Yates, 31 Cal. 82, 89 (1866).
69. 18 Cal. App. 1, 121 P. 933 (1912). See note 49 supra.
70. Comment, Bail" Right or Privilege, 3 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 159, 167
(1974).
71. 5 U.W.L.A. L. REv. 68, 72 (1973).
72. Comment, Bail: Right or Privilege, 3 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 159, 167
(1974).
73. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 350 n.8, 508 P.2d 721, 724 n.8, 107 Cal. Rptr.
401, 404 n.8 (1973).
74. Id. at 352 n.1, 508 P.2d at 726 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 406 n.1.
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6300-6330 regarding mentally disordered sex offenders would solve
the problem of the mentally ill rapist, but would not be effective
in cases where the rapist is not shown to be mentally disturbed75
The only viable solution is a constitutional amendment to the
California bail provision. The California Supreme Court implied
this solution when it said, "If the constitutional guarantees are
wrong, let the people change them-not judges or legislators.' '76
The right to bail must be modified by the inclusion into the Cali-
fornia Constitution of an exception for those accused of forcible
rape where the proof is evident or the presumption great.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERING CALIFORNIA'S
APPROACH TO BAIL
On April 21, 1978, LB 553 was enacted by the Nebraska legisla-
ture proposing that article I, section 9 of the Nebraska. constitu-
tion be amended to deny the right to bail to all persons accused of
"sexual offenses involving penetration by force or against the will
of the victim." 77 On November 7, 1978, the Nebraska voters ap-
proved the proposed amendment by a margin of more than 4-1.78
Although a state constitution is the fundamental law of a state, it
is subject to the limitations found in the United States Constitu-
tion which supercedes all state constitutions.79 If a state constitu-
tional provision directly conflicts with any federal constitutional
guarantees it is invalid.8o
An amendment such as the one passed by the people of Ne-
braska is susceptible to attack on several constitutional grounds.
First, it can be argued that the amendment violates the eighth
amendment's prohibition of excessive bail.s1 Second, it can be ar-
gued that the amendment violates the equal protection clause of
75. Although it is not unreasonable to conclude that any person who would
commit a rape must be insane, this belief has no basis in fact. See M. AmI, supra
note 26, at 315.
76. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 350, 509 P.2d 721, 724, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404
(1973) (citing In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 220, 233 P.2d 159, 162 (1951)).
77. NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 9 now provides: "All persons shall be bailable by suffi-
cient sureties, except for treason, sexual offenses involving penetration by force or
against the will of the victim, and murder, where the proof is evident or the pre-
sumption great...."
78. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 109, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920
(1979).
79. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819).
80. Id.
81. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.L
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the fourteenth amendment.8 2 Third, the amendment arguably vio-
lates a defendant's presumption of innocence protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.83 Lastly, it may
violate a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel
and to freedom to prepare his defense under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments. 84
On April 3, 1979, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in Parker v.
Roth that the new bail provision does not violate the sixth, eighth,
or fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.8 5
On October 16, 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided to
leave the Nebraska law in effect by declining to review the case.86
The Court's action does not set a precedent.8 7 It does, however,
allow the Nebraska law to remain in operation and leaves other
states free to follow Nebraska's example.
An analysis of the constitutional arguments presented in
Parker indicates that there is no constitutional roadblock to a
state denying bail in cases where the defendant is charged with
forcible rape and the proof is evident or the presumption great
that he committed the crime.
Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not
be required."88 This cryptic language has given rise to two
schools of thought concerning the scope of the amendment. One
interpretation is that the eighth amendment creates a right to
bail.89 The other asserts that the eighth amendment prohibits ex-
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
85. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920
(1979).
86. 444 U.S. 920 (1979). Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Jus-
tice Blackmun would have granted certiorari.
87. Review on certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. Be-
cause it is discretionary, a denial ordinarily "carries with it no implication
whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined
to review." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950), L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 35 n.8 (1978).
88. The eighth amendment is not specifically addressed to the states. The
United States Supreme Court has never expressly held that it would be applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A
number of lower courts, however, have made such a finding. Simon v. Woodson,
454 F.2d 161, 164 n.3, 165 nn. 4 & 5 (5th Cir. 1972); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708,
711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court of Howell
County, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963). Subsequent discussion of the eighth
amendment will thus be considered applicable to the state and federal govern-
ment.
89. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 39, at 298, 336; Foote, supra note 39, at 970.
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cessive bail where a right to bail otherwise exists.9 The plain
language of the amendment, its historical background, and the
weight of judicial authority support the latter interpretation.
The eighth amendment contains the only reference to bail in
the United States Constitution. The plain meaning of the lan-
guage of the eighth amendment does not require that every de-
fendant be admitted to bail. Rather, it merely prohibits excessive
bail in cases where bail is allowed.91 Nevertheless, one noted au-
thority argues that this language must be interpreted broadly to
mean that a right to bail exists in almost all cases. Otherwise, the
states could define away the right to bail by enacting legislation
denying bail in all cases, leaving the eighth amendment devoid of
any right to bail.92 Although Professor Foote's argument is logi-
cally sound, it fails to consider one important objection. If the
framers of the United States Constitution intended to create an
absolute right to bail, they would have expressly provided for one.
The total absence of language in the United States Constitution
establishing a right to bail is strong evidence that the framers did
not intend to create such a right.
A complete historical review of the legal development of bail is
unclear, complex, and beyond the scope of this Comment.93 How-
ever, a cursory examination of the historical origins of bail reveals
that the framers of the United States Constitution did not intend
to grant an absolute right to bail.94 The concept of bail came to
90. See, e.g., Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33
(1977); Meyer, supra note 39, at 1179; Mitchell, supra note 39, at 1224, Note, Preven-
tive Detention, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 178, 184 (1967).
91. Professor Foote, supra note 39, at 984-89, suggests that the lack of an ex-
press guarantee of an absolute right to bail resulted in part from the fact that
George Mason, its drafter, was not technically skilled in the law.
92. Id. at 969-71. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (1965) where
then Chief Justice Warren apparently agreed with Foote by saying that eighth
amendment rights have "generally been construed as guaranteeing the right to
bail by logical implication."
93. For a discussion of the history of bail, see D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1964 at 1-8 (1964); R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM 6-10, 21-31, 93-95 (1965);
Duker, supra note 90; Foote, supra note 39; Meyer, supra note 39; Mitchell, supra
note 39; Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 178 (1967); Note, Bail:
An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966 (1961).
94. A detailed analysis of the development of bail in England is unnecessary.
The prohibition against excessive bail evolved from three documents: the Petition
of Right of 1628; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679; and the Bill of Rights of 1689.
There was no absolute right to bail in England and the excessive bail provision
was enacted to prevent judges from setting excessive bail in those cases where the
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the United States with the early English settlers. In 1641, Massa-
chusetts recognized a right to bail in the Massachusetts B6dy of
Liberty. Before the adoption of the Bill of Rights other states cop-
ied the Massachusetts statute and enacted either statutory or
constitutional provisions which established both a right to bail
and a prohibition against excessive bail.9 5 If a provision regarding
excessive bail implied a right to pretrial bail, it is difficult to un-
derstand why the states mention'both. Not only is there no men-
tion of a right to bail in the eighth amendment, but a discussion of
the issue in the congressional debate over the Bill of Rights is al-
most non-existent. 9 6 As the Nebraska Supreme Court observed in
Parker, the framers of the Constitution were obviously familiar
with the presence of a right to bail provision in various colonial
statutes. However, the framers did not include such a provision
in the United States Constitution.97 The logical conclusion is that
they did not intend to create a federal constitutional right to bail.
Shortly before Congress passed the eighth amendment it en-
acted the Judiciary Act of 1789. The act was similar to the colonial
statutes in that it guaranteed a right to bail in all non-capital
criminal cases and provided that bail was discretionary in capital
cases.9 8 The bail provisions of that act are currently codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141-52 (1976).99 If Congress had intended to establish a
right to bail in the eighth amendment, it would have expressly in-
cluded it, just as it did in the Judiciary Act. Moreover, it would be
inconsistent for Congress to adopt an amendment granting a right
to bail just days after passing a statute disallowing that right in
certain cases. The constitutionality of that statute (and every fed-
eral bail statute since 1789) would immediately be called into
defendant was bailable by law. Duker, supra note 90, at 66; Meyer, supra note 39,
at 1180.
95. Meyer, supra note 39, at 1190-91.
96. Foote, supra note 39, at 986. Professor Foote could only discover one refer-
ence to the bail clause in the congressional debates and that was a question as to
what the language meant. The question was not answered.
97. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 111, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920
(1979).
98. Meyer, supra note 39, at 1194, 1455. It is interesting to note that in 1789 all
felonies were capital and therefore not bailable. As an example, the capital crimes
of Massachusetts included:
[I] dolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, willful murder, slaying in anger or cru-
elty of passion, poisoning, bestiality, sodomy, adultery, man stealing, false
witness, conspiring or attempting invasion, insurrection, or public rebel-
lion against the Commonwealth, or treacherously attempting the altera-
tion or subversion of the frame of government, a child over 16 years old
cursing or smiting his parents, a son over 16 rebelling against his parents,
or rape.
Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 112, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920 (1979).
99. See also FED. R. CRnvx. P. 46(a) (1), (a) (2).
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question.OO It is more likely that the eighth amendment was not
intended to create a federal constitutional right to bail, but rather
was intended to protect against the arbitrary use of excessive bail
to deny release. The question of whether a particular offense is
bailable was to be left to the legislature. This allows greater flex-
ibility when changed circumstances or attitudes require a revi-
sion.1 01
There are several situations in which an individual does not
have a right to bail. If the eighth amendment did grant a right to
bail, that right would apply in all instances. Yet both the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 2 and the Bail Reform Act of 1966103
provide that in capital cases the judge has discretion to deny
bail. 0 4 Denial of bail is also allowed in the area of deportation of
aliens. Under section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the
Attorney General has the discretion to retain the defendant in
custody or release him on bail.105 Finally, federal courts have
statutory authorization to deny bail to the mentally incompe-
tent.0
6
An examination of the judicial interpretation of the eighth
amendment provides another clue to its meaning. The United
States Supreme Court has never definitively ruled whether the
eighth amendment means that all defendants must be given a
chance to post bail.'0 7 Carlson v. Landon '0 8 and Stack v. Boyle 109
are the two most significant cases considering the excessive bail
provision of the eighth amendment.
Although Stack involved the question of excessive bail and not
the denial of bail, it is frequently relied on for the principle that
bail is a constitutionally guaranteed right.110 In Stack the defend-
ants were charged with violating the Smith Act and held on
$50,000 bond each. The United States Supreme Court held that
100. Younger, supra note 1, at 278.
101. Meyer, supra note 39, at 1194.
102. FED. R. Calm. P. 46(a) (1), (a) (2).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3152 (1976).
104. Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEo. WASH. L REV. 178, 181 (1967).
105. Id.; Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024 § 23, 64 Stat. 1010.
106. Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 178, 182 (1967); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4244-4248 (1964).
107. Younger, supra note 1, at 277.
108. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
109. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
110. Meyer, supra note 39, at 1172; Note, Bail in the United States: A System in
Need of Reform, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 380, 382 (1963).
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where bail is allowed, there is a right to reasonable bail.ll In
dicta the Court described the right to bail as a "traditional
right."112 The Court's holding, however, was not based upon the
eighth amendment. As the court in Parker pointed out, the Court
in Stack was not talking of the United States Constitution but
was referring solely to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.113
The only United States Supreme Court case involving the con-
stitutionality of a statute authorizing the denial of bail is Carlson
v. Landon.14 Carlson was argued just a few weeks after Stack
was decided. In a five to four decision (with a vigorous dissent by.
Mr. Justice Black)115 the Court upheld the denial of bail to alien
Communists pending deportation proceedings.116 Like Stack,
Carlson is not directly relevant to the issue of pretrial bail in a
criminal proceeding. The deportation of aliens is a civil proceed-
ing. Unlike the Court in Stack, however, the Carlson Court did
address the issue of whether the eighth amendment grants a right
to bail:
The bail clause [eighth amendment] was lifted with slight changes from
the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been
thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that
bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.
When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said
that indicated any different concept. The eighth amendment has not pre-
vented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be
allowed in this country.117
Thus, according to Carlson there is no constitutional right to
bail." 8 Chief Justice Vinson, author of the opinion in Stack,
111. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
112. From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789... to the present Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure ... federal law has unequivocally pro-
vided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to
bail. This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the un-
hampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to conviction.... Unless this right to bail before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of
struggle, would lose its meaning.
Id.
113. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 112, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920
(1979).
114. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
115. Justice Black argued that the interpretation of the majority would nullify
the protection of the eighth amendment since the right to be protected [bail]
could be implemented out of existence. It was a contradiction to say that the
eighth amendment prohibits use of excessive bail to deny release but allow the
legislature to totally destroy the right. Id. at 556-58. Portman, supra note 39, at
242. See also Foote, supra note 39, at 969-71.
116. Portman, supra note 39, at 242.
117. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952).
118. See Foote, supra note 39, at 979, for an attack on the Court's historical
analysis. It has also been said that since the case dealt with 'the rights of Com-
munists during the witch-hunt days of the early 1950's" it may not be strong au-
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joined in the Court's opinion in Carlson. His agreement with the
majority in Carlson indicates that reliance on Stack as support
for a constitutional right to bail is misplaced.119
The case of Mastrian v. Hedman 20 also supports the proposi-
tion that the eighth amendment does not grant a right to bail. In
Mastrian the court said that it is within the discretion of the
states to determine which offenses will be bailable, and therefore
subject to the eighth amendment, and which will not be baila-
ble.121 An examination of the more recent decisions interpreting
the eighth amendment indicates that the weight of authority fol-
lows the reasoning in Carlson and Mastrian.12 2
Based on the language of the eighth amendment and its histori-
cal development and judicial interpretation, it is clear that there
is no constitutional right to bail. The states are free to define the
offenses that are bailable and those that are not.
Equal Protection
An amendment to the California constitution must also meet
the requirements of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Opponents of the
proposed amendment may argue that the amendment denies rap-
ists the equal protection of the laws by subjecting them to a sys-
tem of pretrial detention not applicable to persons charged with
other crimes. The equal protection clause provides that a state
may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."'1 2 3 The United States Supreme Court has for-
mulated three tests for determining whether or not a state
legislative classification violates the equal protection clause: the
rational basis test, the strict scrutiny test, and a new intermediate
thority. Miller, Preventive Detention-A Guide to the Eradication of Individual
Rights, 16 How. L.J. 1 (1970).
119. Meyer, supra note 39, at 1172.
120. 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
121. "Traditionally and acceptedly, there are offenses of a nature as to which a
state properly may refuse to make provision for a right to bail." Id. at 710-11.
122. See, e.g., Bloss v. Michigan, 421 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1970); Assad v. Henry, 317
F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Covington v. Coparo, 297 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Fink v. Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716 (E.DJLA. 1968), aftd, 408 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969). Contra United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir.
1926); Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also CA CONST. art. I, § 7: "A person may
not be... denied equal protection of the laws ......
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standard.124 Using the traditional rational basis test, a state-cre-
ated classification is valid if the classification bears a rational rela-
tion to a permissible state objective. 25 The strict scrutiny test is
far more rigorous and requires that the state demonstrate that
the classification is necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest.126 The strict scrutiny test is applied whenever
the classification infringes on a "fundamental right"127 or involves
a "suspect class."' 28 Several recent decisions indicate the emer-
gence of an intermediate test which is more deferential than strict
scrutiny but more exacting than the rational relation test.1 2 9
Under the intermediate test the classification must be substan-
tially related to an important state interest. In applying this test
the court balances the interest of the state against the interest of
those disadvantaged by the classification.130 This intermediate
test has only been specifically applied to classifications based on
gender' 3 ' and illegitimacy.132 Nonetheless, a growing range of
cases, involving classifications other than gender and illegitimacy,
and involving a number of important but not "Constitutionally
124. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1002 (1978);
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972); Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1064 (1969);
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 177 (1977).
125. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973)
("A legislative classification must be sustained if it is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental objective"); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1966) ("[Equal
protection] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective.").
126. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.73
(1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
127. Interests which have been judicially designated as "fundamental" include
the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969), the right to vote,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966), the right to privacy,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), the right to equal access to appel-
late review, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), the right to marry and procre-
ate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and all first amendment rights.
See Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1064, 1128
(1969).
128. The Supreme Court has held that classifications are suspect if they are
based on alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); race, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); or national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
129. See generally The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 72, 177-88
(1977).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (such classifications must bear a "close and substantial relationship to
important governmental objectives").
132. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lall, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (although not subject to strict
scrutiny, classifications based on illegitimacy are invalid under the fourteenth
amendment "if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests").
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fundamental" interests, have also triggered approaches some-
where between the rational relation test and the strict scrutiny
test.133
In examining the proposed California amendment, the initial
question is whether it would infringe on a fundamental interest or
discriminate on the basis of a suspect class. In San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez134 the United States
Supreme Court stated that the judiciary may not create funda-
mental rights; rights must have their basis in the Constitution.135
The social importance of the right or interest involved is not the
critical determinant. "IT] he answer lies in assessing whether...
[the] right... is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution."'136 In accordance with this view, the Court refused to
expand the existing list of fundamental rights and suspect classi-
fications. 137 In view of the language of the eighth amendment, its
historical development, and its judicial interpretations, bail is not
a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion.138 Although one commentator has argued that because bail
is mentioned in the United States Constitution it is sufficiently
fundamental to merit strict scrutiny, 139 the United States
Supreme Court has not been disposed to make such a finding.140
In addition, there is a dearth of scholarly articles that espouse the
contrary.141
Since there is no fundamental right to bail with a basis in the
United States Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is not applica-
ble. However, the decision still remains as to which of the less
demanding tests should be applied-the rational basis test or the
intermediate test. The denial of bail does involve a loss of per-
133. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976) (ineligibil-
ity for employment in major sector of economy); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459
(1973) (White, J., concurring) (interest in obtaining higher education at affordable
tuition); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (interest in retaining drivers i-
cense).
134. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
135. "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." Id. at 33.
136. Id.
137. See notes 127-28 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 88-123 supra.
139. Ervin, supra note 39, at 336-37.
140. See text accompanying notes 107-123 supra.
141. See, e.g., Duker, supra note 90; Meyer, supra note 39; Mitchell, supra note
39.
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sonal liberty, an interest the Court has described as traditional.142
Thus, although bail may not fall within the Court's restricted view
of "fundamental rights," it could arguably be subject to an active
judicial review more demanding than the basic requirement of
minimum rationality.
The purpose of the proposed forcible rape amendment is two-
fold: (1) to ensure the defendant's presence at trial and (2) to
protect the safety of the public. These purposes are clearly within
the police power of the state. Consequently, the only question to
be answered is whether the amendment is substantially related to
these important state interests.
The Court has indicated that statistical evidence is usually rele-
vant in determining whether a particular law bears a substantial
relationship to the achievement of important state interests.143
Literature analyzing the recidivism' 44 among forcible rapists is
meager.145 The data that are available indicate that a person who
has committed a violent, psychologically motivated crime like for-
cible rape is capable of committing other crimes while free on
bail. One noted author has reported the results from a study of
646 cases of forcible rape that occurred in Philadelphia from Janu-
ary 1, 1958, to December 31, 1958, and from January 1, 1960, to De-
cember 31, 1960.14 Information was obtained from the Morals
Squad of the Philadelphia Police Department where all com-
plaints about rape are recorded and filed. The data showed a high
proportion of offenders with previous criminal records (49.3%). In
addition, the study showed a significant association between a
record of arrest for forcible rape alone or rape combined with
other sex offenses and the onset of a criminal career. A similar
142. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
143. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976).
144. Recidivism is herein defined as the number of arrests, convictions, or com-
mitments for past offenses of a given offender. M. Amim, supra note 26, at 109.
145. One explanation for this lack of statistical evidence is the fact that rape is
generally conceded to be among the most under-reported crimes of violence
against the person. The only statistical count of the numbers of forcible rapes in
the United States is compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from reports
of police departments. These figures, however, are only the tip of the iceberg. Ac-
cording to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the ra-
tio of unreported rapes to reported rapes is conservatively estimated at 80%.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE-FINAL PROJECT REPORT 11 (1978).
Besides the failure of women to report rapes, there are other reasons that the
actual number of rapes can't be established. The various police departments re-
port rape in a variety of ways, charges are often dropped or reduced to a lesser
offense, and it is difficult to gather evidence to support a charge of rape. J.
LaPlount & L. Schaefer, Rape: A Focus on the Victim (May 1973) (unpublished
thesis in California State University at San Diego Library).
146. M. AMIR, supra note 26, at 109-25.
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study shows that among seventy-seven rapists in the Colorado
State Penitentiary, eighty-five percent had a previous arrest rec-
ord. Twelve percent had been convicted of forcible rape, and
thirty-eight percent had either committed previous rapes, been
arrested for investigation of rape, or been convicted of other sex-
ual offenses.147 A Canadian study found that ninety-five percent
of thirty rapists in a penitentiary had previous convictions,
nineteen percent had been convicted for sexual offenses, and
twenty-seven percent had been convicted for aggressive of-
fenses. 48 And in a study of forcible rape in San Diego County,
California, from 1968 to 1972, 65.5% of offenders had previous crim-
inal records. Twenty-two percent of the offenders had previous
records for sex offenses.149 This statistical evidence supports the
conclusion that sex offenders are usually recidivists. 5 0
Forcible rape is a particularly repugnant crime, charged with
danger and the possibility of death to a victim. It constitutes a se-
rious and increasing danger to the public. To require that a per-
son accused of forcible rape be denied bail pending trial is not
unreasonable where the proof is evident or the presumption great
that the crime was committed. This response to the problem of
147. J. MAcDoNALD, RAPE OFFENDERS -AND THEIR VicTIMs 24, 55 (1971).
148. McCaldon, Rape, CAN. J. CORRECrIONs 37 (1967). See also Svalostoga,
Rape and Social Structure, PAC. Soc. REV. 48 (1962) (among 141 rapists studied in
Denmark, 77% had previous criminal records); supra note 28.
149. T. Johnson, A Study of Forcible Rape in San Diego County 1968-1972 (1974)
(unpublished thesis in California State University at San Diego Library).
150. But see B. KARAiAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His OFFENSES (1954); P.
TAPPAN, THE HABrruAL SEX OFFENDER (1950). The discrepancies between the vari-
ous studies on recidivism may be accounted for by the fact that measurements of
recidivism have been made on the basis of different types of records. Those stud-
ies evidencing a high recidivism rate were based on arrest records while those re-
porting a low recidivism rate utilized conviction or commitment records. The use
of arrest records instead of conviction or commitment records is better suited to
the analysis of recidivism among those involved in the crime of forcible rape for a
number of reasons. First, since arrest is the step of the penal administration near-
est to the crime, the law of "case mortality" operates less here. "Case mortality"
is the decrease in the proportion of offenders with criminal records as one moves
from arrest records to conviction records. Second, a previous arrest record is more
likely to be in the file of an offender who has committed a crime in the past. Third,
the absence of a conviction record is not evidence that the crime was not commit-
ted. Arrest records show that such behavior did occur but that for some reason
the offender did not face a trial. Fourth, the occurrence of the crime, its reporting,
and the arrest record are likely to coincide, making arrest records a better basis
for measuring characteristics of offenders. Finally, the "vicissitudes of arrest from
one period of time to another, and from one community to another, are probably
less than those connected with court and sentencing procedures." M. Amm, supra
note 26, at 109-11.
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rape does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment merely because all offenses with similar or greater
penalties are not treated the same. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the United States Constitution allows a state
to recognize degrees of harm and to attack those areas it consid-
ers most in need of reform.' 5 ' A state need not choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem
at all. As the court in Parker stated, "[t]he minimum penalty is
not the issue in a determination that violent rape ... should not
be bailable. The real possibility of repeated acts and further vic-
tims pending trial is the issue."152 The suggested California
amendment would not be an arbitrary decision but would bear a
substantial relationship to important state interests.
Presumption of Innocence
A constitutional amendment that empowers the courts to deny
bail where the defendant has been charged with forcible rape can-
not violate the presumption of innocence protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As the court in
Parker pointed out, the presumption of innocence is merely a
rule of evidence that attaches to a defendant at the beginning of a
trial and remains with the defendant throughout the trial.153 The
presumption has nothing to do with confinement or release prior
to trial.154 It primarily serves the purpose of impressing on the
judge or jury that any doubts as to a defendant's guilt must be re-
solved in his favor and that the burden of proving guilt is on the
prosecution. 55
If the presumption of innocence was a bar to the proposed Cali-
fornia amendment, it would also bar pretrial detention of those
charged with a capital crime and those who could not raise bail.
Theoretically, it could even be extended to prevent police from ar-
151. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
152. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 116, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920
(1979).
153. Id.
154. Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 177 (1967); Note, Preven-
tive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1501 (1966). Contra, Tribe, An
Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L.
REV. 371 (1970).
155. In criminal cases, the 'presumption of innocence' has been adopted by
judges as a convenient introduction to the statement of the burdens upon
the prosecution, first of producing evidence of the guilt of the accused and,
second, of finally persuading the jury or judge of his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 806 (2d ed. E. Cleary ed. 1972).
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resting persons and taking them into custody. 5 6 The fact that the
presumption of innocence has not been so applied supports the
theory that pretrial detention has no relationship to the presump-
tion of innocence.
The purpose of the proposed amendment is to allow bail to be
denied to those persons charged with forcible rape where the
court finds that the proof is evident or the presumption is great
that the person committed the crime. This legitimate purpose in
no way conflicts with or violates the purpose of the presumption
of innocence, which is to instill in the minds of the court and jury
that the burden is on the prosecution at trial to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty.157
CONCLUSION
Article I, section 12 of the California constitution mandates that
those charged with a non-capital offense be granted bail as a mat-
ter of right. In In re Underwood the California Supreme Court
held that bail may not be denied to protect the public. The posi-
tion the court took in Underwood is supported by the history of
bail in California, the early decisions of the California Supreme
Court interpreting article I, section 12, and the unequivocal lan-
guage of article I, section 12. Despite the validity of the court's
position, society's interests are underprotected with regard to the
crime of forcible rape.
Forcible rape is traumatic and dehumanizing. Frequently the
victim is treated brutally by the attacker and suffers substantial
physical and psychological injuries. The primary motive for forci-
156. Hruska, Preventive Detention: The Constitution and the Congress, 3
CREIGHTON L. REV. 36, 49; Mitchell, supra note 39, at 1231-32.
157. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 116-17, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
920 (1979).
The proposed amendment may also be susceptible to attack on the ground that
it violates the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel and to free-
dom to prepare his defense under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. An ac-
cused is guaranteed the right to consult with an attorney. That attorney must be
given adequate time and opportunity to prepare a defense. See, e.g., United States
v. Wheeler, 434 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1970). This does not, however, include the right
to be free from custody after being charged with a crime. Whether or not an ac-
cused is being retained on a nonbailable offense is irrelevant to a determination of
whether he has competent counsel who has adequate time to prepare his defense.
Otherwise, all defendants must be guaranteed release on bail, yet no such re-
quirement exists. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W.2d 106, 117, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 920 (1979).
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ble rape is not sexual gratification. Rather, it is a desire to inflict
violence upon the victim. A person who has committed such a vi-
olent, psychologically motivated crime is capable of committing a
similar crime while free on bail. Those charged with forcible rape
pose a significant threat to society and should not be released on
bail pending trial if the proof is evident or the presumption great
that they did commit the crime.
Because the California constitution prevents the courts from
withholding bail in forcible rape cases, a constitutional amend-
ment denying the right to bail to those accused of forcible rape
when "the proof is evident or the presumption great" is needed.
An analysis of the United States Constitution reveals that there is
no constitutional roadblock to such an amendment. Based on the
language, historical development, and judicial interpretation of
the eighth amendment, there is no constitutional right to bail.
The states are free to define the offenses that are bailable and
those that are not. Furthermore, the proposed California amend-
ment would not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Rape poses a threat to the victim and to
society. There is nothing unreasonable about the conclusion that
it is in society's best interests to deny bail to persons charged
with forcible rape. This response to the problem of rape does not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
merely because all offenses with similar or greater penalties are
not treated the same. The United States Supreme Court has held,
in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. ,158 that the United
States Constitution allows a state to recognize degrees of harm
and to attack those areas it considers most in need of reform. A
state need not choose between attacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking the problem at all.
Finally, the two-fold purpose of the amendment, insuring the
defendant's presence at trial and protecting the safety of the pub-
lic, does not conflict with the presumption of innocence guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The purpose of the presumption of innocence is to instill in the
minds of the court and jury that the burden is on the prosecutor
at trial to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is
guilty.
Forcible rapists constitute a distinct class of criminals and
members of that class should not be entitled to pretrial release.
In the words of Chief Justice Krivosha of the Nebraska Supreme
158. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
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Court, "[s]ociety deserves more."15 9
KATHy M. PisuLA
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159. Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 868, 278 N.W. 2d 106, 116, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
920 (1979).

